ANALISIS PRINCIPAL-AGENT PADA PROSES PELUNASAN KREDIT USAHA PRODUKTIF BAGI USAHA MIKRO DAN KECIL DI KABUPATEN BANYUMAS DAN PURBALINGGA

Agus Arifin, Rakhmat Priyono

Abstract


Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menginvestigasi efek dari informasi asimetris dalam pasar kredit (loanable fund market) antara bank dan debitur usaha mikro dan kecil (UMK). Efek yang dimaksud adalah adverse selection (sebelum kontrak kredit) dan moral hazard (setelah kontrak kredit). Data yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini berasal dari bank dan debitur UMK yang diambil dengan menggunakan metode simple random sampling di wilayah kerja Purbalingga dan Banyumas. Adverse selection dideteksi dengan menetapkan pertanyaan spesifik kepada debitur secara independen untuk mengeksplorasi kemungkinan kesalahan dalam proses penyaringan proposal. Kemudian, moral hazard dianalisis dengan metode rating scale untuk mengukur tingkat moral hazard masing-masing debitur. Selanjutnya, keduanya dianalisis untuk menginvestigasi efek adverse selection terhadap moral hazard dengan metode multiple regression. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa (1) dalam proses seleksi, telah terjadi adverse selection akibat dari informasi yang tidak lengkap sulit diperoleh oleh bank, (2) sebagian besar debitur memiliki tingkat moral hazard sedang-tinggi, (3) adverse selection memiliki pengaruh signifikan negatif terhadap moral hazard. Dari hasil, dapat disarankan bahwa (1) adverse selection harus diminimalkan karena merupakan sumber utama terjadinya masalah lebih lanjut, (2) moral hazard debitur dapat dideteksi lebih awal dengan menilai karakter dan kapasitas mereka saat mengajukan proposal kredit.

 

Kata kunci: informasi asimetris, moral hazard, adverse selection, debitur UMK

 

This research aims to investigate the effects of asymmetrical information in the loanable fund market between banks and micro and small enterprises (MSEs). Those effect are adverse selection (before credit contract) and moral hazard (after credit contract). The data used in this research come from banks and MSEs’ debtors taken by using simple random sampling method in Purbalingga and Banyumas working areas. Adverse selection was detected by assigning specific questions to the debtor independently to explore the possibility of any mistakes within proposal screening process. Then, moral hazard was analyzed by rating scale method to measure the level of moral hazard of each debtor. Hereafter, both of them were analyzed to investigate the effect of adverse selection on moral hazard by multiple regression method. This research found that (1) in the selection process, adverse selection has occurred due to incomplete information that was difficult to  obtain by banks, (2) most  debtors have  medium-high level of  moral hazard,  (3) adverse  selection  effect  on moral hazard significantly. From the results, it can be suggested that (1) adverse selection must be minimized because it was the main source of subsequent problems, (2) debtor's moral hazard could be detected early by assessing their character and capacity when applying credit proposals.

 

Key words: asymmetric information, adverse selection, moral hazard, MSEs’ debtors



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